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The survey of dialysis therapy during the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster (GEJED) highlighted the vulnerability
of chronic dialysis therapy and dialysis patients to disasters. To minimize negative effects on patients on chronic
maintenance dialysis during large-scale disasters that may occur in the future, it is important to promote the self-help
efforts of dialysis facilities and to develop mutual assistance systems within local communities. Each dialysis facility has
to take comprehensive disaster managements, including vibration control of large machinery, the use of flexible tubes,
securing patient beds, and un-securing stand-type bedside consoles. Local governments should plan in advance how
to support chronic dialysis therapy in their areas and how to assign roles among themselves when dealing with a large
number of patients with acute kidney injury during long-term disruption of lifelines including electricity, water supply,
and fuel. Dialysis patients are likely to develop cardiovascular events in times of disaster because of physical and
psychological stress. Dialysis patients should understand in advance the key points of self-care in times of disaster and
the availability of dialysis therapy in remote locations. It is also important to provide appropriate antihypertensive
treatment to patients.
Abbreviations: AKI, Acute kidney failure; APD, Automated peritoneal dialysis; CAPD, Continuous ambulatory peritoneal
dialysis; GEJED, The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster; GHAED, The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster;
IAEA, The International Atomic Energy Agency; JACE, Japan Association for Clinical Engineers; JADP, Japanese
Association of Dialysis Physicians; JSDT, Japanese Society for Dialysis Therapy; JSN, Japanese Society of Nephrology;
M, Magnitude; MCA, Multi-channel access; PD, Peritoneal dialysis; RO, Reverse osmosis; SPEEDI, The System for
Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information; WG, Working groupIntroduction
The largest earthquake in recorded history in Japan with
a magnitude (M) of 9.0, which was centered off the
Pacific coast of Tohoku, hit the Tohoku region and all of
eastern Japan from Hokkaido to the Kanto region at
14:46 on 11 March 2011. The subsequent enormous
tsunami caused by the earthquake struck the coast of* Correspondence: imasakan.aipod@seieig.or.jp
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of lives and inflicting tremendous damage on social
infrastructures. In addition, accidents occurred at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo
Electric Power Company. The Great East Japan Earthquake
Disaster (GEJED) caused unprecedentedly serious and
complex damage, from which the affected areas are still
recovering.
Dialysis therapy, especially hemodialysis, is considered
vulnerable to large-scale disasters because it uses
approximately 250 L of water in one session of treat-
ment, it cannot be performed without electricity, and it
requires the smooth distribution of products such asOpen Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
e (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
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fluid. There are two issues regarding dialysis therapy in
times of a large-scale disaster: how to treat the acute
kidney failure (AKI) due to rhabdomyolysis, which is
caused by multiple injuries, and how to continue chronic
maintenance dialysis. The incidents of AKI caused by
multiple injuries were low in GEJED because 92.5 % of
the victims died from drowning in the huge tsunami [1].
The serious problem highlighted by this disaster was the
difficulty in continuing maintenance dialysis due to the
inundation of dialysis facilities by the tsunami, the long-
term disruption of lifelines including electricity and
water supplies over a wide area, and the disruption of
product distribution.
In cooperation with three organizations involved in
dialysis therapy, the Japanese Society for Dialysis Ther-
apy (JSDT), the Japanese Society of Nephrology (JSN),
and the Japanese Association of Dialysis Physicians
(JADP), the Working Group (WG) for Survey of Dialysis
Therapy during GEJED was established in order to
determine what actually happened at sites of dialysis
therapy during GEJED and how we can prepare for fu-
ture disasters. The “Report of Survey of Dialysis Therapy
during the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster:
Recommendations for Dialysis Therapy Preparation in
Case of Future Disasters” was published in December
2013. This report consists of three chapters providing
general statements and seven chapters providing specificTable 1 Contents of report on survey of dialysis therapy during GEJ
I. List of recommendations for dialysis during disasters
Recommendation 1: Disaster countermeasures for dialysis facilities, the sec
Recommendation 2: Future disaster countermeasures based on the experi
Recommendation 3: Transfer of dialysis patients during disasters and dialys
Recommendation 4: Care of dialysis patients during disasters
Recommendation 5: Support of human and material resources during disa
Recommendation 6: Tokyo Inland Earthquake
Recommendation 7: Formation of collaborative systems among local dialy
and patient education
II. General: Large-scale disasters and dialysis therapy
Section 1: Outline of Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster
Section 2: Large-scale disasters and dialysis therapy
Section 3: Survey of dialysis therapy during the Great East Japan Earthquak
III. Each section: Results of survey of dialysis therapy during the Great East Japan
Section 1: Current status of damage to dialysis therapy caused by the disa
Section 2: Reports from affected areas
Section 3: Transfer of patients and dialysis therapy at alternative facilities
Section 4: Disaster-related patho-physiology in dialysis patients
Section 5: Support for affected facilities
Section 6: Preparedness for Tokyo Inland Earthquake
Section 7: Formation of local disaster response network, communication mdiscussions, summarizing the survey results and the rec-
ommendations on how to implement dialysis therapy in
future disasters [2] (Table 1). This manuscript provides
an overview of GEJED, the extent of damage to dialysis
facilities, the disaster management measures taken, the
transfer of patients, and the care provided to dialysis
patients during the disaster. The recommendations for
dialysis therapy preparation in case of future disasters
were summarized in Appendixes 1 and 2.
Currently, while the use of dialysis therapy is rapidly
expanding mainly in developing countries, large-scale
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and droughts are
occurring around the world. Providing dialysis therapy
in times of large-scale disasters is now a global concern.
We have realized through GEJED that it is our important
responsibility to share the experiences with the world and
to make recommendations for the continued provision of
dialysis therapy in times of disaster.
Overview of damages from GEJED
Overview of the earthquake off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku
The earthquake that caused GEJED occurred at 14:46 on
11 March 2011 and was named the Earthquake off the
Pacific Coast of Tohoku. The epicenter was located
approximately 130 km east-southeast off the Oshika
Peninsula at a depth of 24 km. The magnitude of the
earthquake was M9.0 [3], which was the largest in the
recorded history in Japan and the fourth largest in theE
uring of lifelines, and a support system for supplying resources
ences in the affected facilities
is therapy at alternative facilities
sters
sis facilities and governments, regular communications,
e Disaster
Earthquake Disaster and recommendations for dialysis during disasters
ster-Analysis based on the annual JSDT Renal Registry
ethods, and patient education
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Alaska earthquake in 1964 (M9.2), and the Indonesia
Sumatra earthquake in 2004 (M9.1). The maximum seis-
mic intensity was 7 on the Japanese scale, which was
recorded in the northern area of Miyagi Prefecture. The
seismic intensity was 6+ in 36 cities, towns, and villages
in four prefectures (Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and
Tochigi Prefectures), and in Miyagino, Sendai City [3]
(Fig. 1). This was the third time that a seismic intensity
of 7 was recorded in Japan following the Southern
Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake that caused the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 and the Niigata
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in 2007.
The Earthquake off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku oc-
curred around the Japan Trench, which is the boundary
of the North American plate and the Pacific plate that is
sliding underneath the North American plate. This
earthquake was of the “consolidated type,” namely, the
earthquakes caused by three fault ruptures off the coast
of Miyagi Prefecture, further off the coast, and in the ad-
jacent sea of the northern area of Ibaraki Prefecture,
were linked to each other. As a result, the ruptured part
of the fault extended approximately 400 km in the
north-south direction and 200 km in the west-eastFig. 1 Map of prefectures in Japan, seismic intensity, and tsunami height. L
from the following HP and trimmed for intended use http://www.abysse.co
data on seismic intensity are cited from the following HP https://ja.wikiped
E5%A4%AA%E5%B9%B3%E6%B4%8B%E6%B2%96%E5%9C%B0%E9%9C%87
on 11 March 2011. Circled N represents the location of the Fukushima Daiic
City is approximately 300 km and that between Tokyo and the Fukushimadirection, generating a huge tsunami that hit a wide area
from Hokkaido to Chiba Prefecture. The recorded height
of the tsunami was more than 10 m along the Pacific
coast of Aomori to Chiba Prefectures, 6–8 m along the
Pacific coast of Hokkaido, 2–3 m along the Pacific coast
of Tokai region, the Kii Peninsula, and Shikoku, and
1–2 m along the Pacific coast of Kyushu (Fig. 1). The
inundation height, which was related to facility damage,
increased southward from the central part of Aomori
Prefecture, exceeding 10 m in the northern area of Iwate
Prefecture, and reaching around 10–15 m along the
Sanriku Coast including the Oshika Peninsula. The max-
imum inundation height along Sendai Bay was estimated
to be 8–9 m. The maximum run-up height was 40.1 m
which was recorded in Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture.
The tsunami destroyed breakwaters, devastated towns,
ran up rivers, and even caused damage to settlements
6 km inland. The area affected by the inundation due to
the tsunami and ground subsidence was 561 km2 and ex-
tended from Aomori to Chiba Prefectures.
Overview of damage
(a)Damage to human lifeeft: Map of prefectures and tsunami height/the map of Japan is cited
.jp/japan/japanmap02.html. Right: Seismic intensity at each site/the
ia.org/wiki/%E6%9D%B1%E5%8C%97%E5%9C%B0%E6%96%B9%
. Star represents the epicenter of the earthquake that occurred at 14:16
hi Nuclear Power Station. The distance between Tokyo and Sendai
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is approximately 220 km
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and Disaster Management Agency on 9 September 2015
regarding the Earthquake off the Pacific Coast of
Tohoku, the death toll from the disaster was 19,335 as
of 1 September 2015; 5127 people died in Iwate Prefec-
ture, 10,538 in Miyagi Prefecture, 3559 in Fukushima
Prefecture, 65 in Ibaraki Prefecture, and 22 in Chiba
Prefecture [4] (Table 2). The death toll was high in the
prefectures severely damaged by the tsunami, and the
death toll in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures
in the Tohoku region accounted for 99.6 % of the total
death toll. The highest death toll ever in Japan was
105,000 for the Taisho Great Kanto Earthquake followed
by that in GEJED, which was more than threefold that
for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster
(GHAED) in 1995 (6434 dead and 3 missing) (Table 2).
According to the National Police Agency Report, as of
11 April 2011, the causes of death of 13,135 people aut-
opsied in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures were
92.5 % drowning, 4.4 % crushing and fatal injuries, 1.1 %
death by fire, and 2 % unknown [1]. The number of
missing persons was 2600 as of 1 September 2015; 1129
in Iwate Prefecture, 1242 in Miyagi Prefecture, 225 in
Fukushima Prefecture, and 4 in other prefectures. The
search for missing persons is continuing. On the otherTable 2 Comparison of the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster











Half destroyed 275,118 144,274




Damage to roads 4,200 sections 7,245 sections
Damage to bridges 116 sections 774 sections
Period of traffic
restrictions
12 days 1 year and 7 months












Telephone interruptions Approx. 1.9 million
lines (fixed line)
More than 0.3
million lineshand, the number of missing persons was only 3 in
GHAED, which was a near-field earthquake and not
followed by tsunami. The total number of persons in-
jured by GEJED was 6219; 4145 in Miyagi Prefecture,
712 in Ibaraki Prefecture, 256 in Chiba Prefecture, 211
in Iwate Prefecture, and 183 in Fukushima Prefecture.
The number of injured persons in Miyagi Prefecture
accounted for 66.7 % of the total, but the people were
distributed over a wide area from the Tohoku to Kanto
regions. In GHAED, the number of persons injured by the
collapse of buildings was 43,792, which was approximately
sevenfold that in GEJED. On the other hand, most of the
human damage in GEJED was caused by the tsunami.
(b)Structural damage
As previously mentioned, the number of deaths due to
the collapse of buildings was lower in GEJED than in
GHAED because of the differences in the characteristics
of the earthquake waves. However, because GEJED
affected a broad area, the number of damaged buildings
was higher than that in GHAED. Nationwide, the num-
ber of completely destroyed buildings was 124,690; half
destroyed buildings, 275,118; and partially damaged
buildings, 764,843 (Table 2). Nevertheless, the number
of persons who died from crushing and the number of
injured persons were very low compared with those in
GHAED probably because of the differences in the char-
acteristics of the earthquake waves, the building density
and structures, and the population density in the af-
fected area. The number of damaged sections of roads
and the number of damaged bridges were 4,200 and 116,
respectively, in GEJED, both of which were lower than
the corresponding numbers in GHAED (7,245 and 774,
respectively). This may arise because of differences in
the density of infrastructure in the affected areas
(Table 2).
(c)Traffic disturbance
On 12 March 2011, some sections of the Tohoku
Expressway, Joban Expressway, and Ban-etsu Expressway
were designated as emergency traffic routes based on
the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act, and private
passenger vehicles were restricted. These restrictions
were gradually lifted as the expressways were repaired,
and all the traffic restrictions on the major expressways
were lifted on 24 March 2011.
(d)Disruption of lifelines
According to the government report published on 27
November 2012, the overview of the disruption of life-
lines in GEJED was as follows; water supplies were
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interruption, approximately 420,000 households; and
power outages, approximately 8,440,000 households.
Power outages affected significantly larger areas in GEJED
than in GHAED (Table 2). Long-term interruption of the
power supply occurred in a broad area particularly be-
cause of the accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company and the
damage to thermal power stations. As a result, rolling
blackouts were implemented across the country and the
continuation of daily dialysis therapy was severely inter-
rupted even in areas not directly hit by the earthquake.
GEJED caused massive damage to information and
telecommunication infrastructures, including the break-
age of transmission lines due to the earthquake and sub-
sequent tsunami, the dysfunction of telecommunication
buildings due to large-scale power outages, and the dam-
age to cellular base stations. Approximately 1.9 million
lines of four telecommunication providers and a max-
imum of 29,000 cellular and PHS base stations of five
mobile telecommunication providers were out of service
at that time. Telecommunications companies imposed
communication restrictions in the early stages of the dis-
aster, which largely interrupted information gathering
and transmission as well as the confirmation of the
safety of victims in the affected areas. Some social net-
working services on the Internet were effective under
these circumstances and attracted attention as new ways
to collect information and communicate in the affected
areas. In addition, free services on public pay phones,
specially installed public pay phones, emergency message
services, and other measures of telecommunication were
made available at that time. The communication, which
failed because of the damage to information and tele-
communication infrastructure, was recovered by the end
of April 2011 in most areas.
Accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
of Tokyo Electric Power Company
The damage caused by GEJED became severe and
complicated because of the accidents at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power
Company that followed the Earthquake off the Pacific
Coast of Tohoku. The nuclear reactors operating at
Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations shut down
automatically immediately after the earthquake. After
that, however, all AC power in these nuclear power
stations was lost when the facilities were hit by the
tsunami, making it impossible to cool their reactor cores.
A nuclear emergency was declared at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station at 19:03 on March 11 and
at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station at 7:45 on
March 12. Efforts were made to prevent hydrogen explo-
sions by venting (the release of steam out of a nuclearreactor containment to lower the pressure inside) and by
pouring water into the nuclear reactor. However, hydro-
gen explosions occurred in Unit 1 at 15:36 on March 12,
in Unit 3 on March 14, and in Unit 2 on March 15, result-
ing in the release of large amounts of radioactive mate-
rials. These accidents were reported to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as level 7, the worst on the
nuclear accident scale, on April 12.
At 21:23 on March 11, the Prime Minister ordered all
residents within a 3-km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station to evacuate and also all residents
within a 3–10-km radius to stay inside their houses.
Afterward, the evacuation area was expanded to a 20-km
radius and the “stay in-house area” to a 20–30-km radius
by March 15. Because of these evacuation orders for a
broad area and the rumors concerning radioactive con-
tamination, it became impossible to continue chronic
maintenance dialysis therapy in that area and a number
of dialysis patients needed to be transferred to other
areas. On March 16, the US Government ordered all
Americans in Japan within an 80-km radius of Fukushima
to evacuate according to the advisory from IAEA. It was
later pointed out that local residents were exposed to
radioactive contamination because the results of the
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information (SPEEDI) were not disclosed immediately
after the accidents. Whether the evacuation area set by
the Japanese government was appropriate or not has been
examined [5]. If the evacuation area had been set at an 80-
km radius according to the IAEA, it would have included
not only the cities of Koriyama and Fukushima but also
Hitachi City in Ibaraki Prefecture all of which have many
dialysis patients. It is beyond our imagination how many
dialysis patients would have needed to be transferred and
what kind of measures would have been required.
Disaster planning before GEJED
Disaster information network of the JADP
According to the cabinet office, Japan has experienced
20.6 % of earthquakes of M6 or higher, has 7.0 % of the
number of active volcanos, and has sustained 18.3 % of
the damage from disasters all over the world, although
its total land area is only 0.25 % of the total world land
area. Japan is one of the most disaster-prone countries
in the world [6]. Through its experience in a number of
large-scale disasters, chronic dialysis therapy has become
recognized as vulnerable to disasters, and various counter-
measures with regard to this therapy have been estab-
lished. As a result, the disaster information network on
dialysis therapy correctly grasped the extent of damage
and immediately established a dialysis support system dur-
ing GEJED. This network was developed mainly by JADP
after GHAED in 1995. Not only dialysis facilities through-
out the country but also the disaster management
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pate this network, which is very effective for sharing real-
time information in times of disaster.
JADP was established from the association of municipal
societies of dialysis physicians in 1985. Since then, it has
focused on preparation for disasters as one of its primary
activities. In November 1987, the association launched an
emergency dialysis therapy system for disasters, which is a
system of registering data on dialysis facilities and patients
with the aim of providing support in times of large-scale
disaster and promoting research studies in ordinary times.
In 1995, 1243 facilities (43.4 % of the facilities in the coun-
try) and 48,389 patients (31.3 % of the patients in the
country) were registered in the system. However, this sys-
tem did not work as expected in GHAED in 1995 because
of the unexpectedly large extent of damage, and a large
number of patients experienced difficulty in receiving dia-
lysis therapy. From the experience in GHAED, JADP spe-
cified “the secure provision of dialysis therapy to patients
undergoing maintenance dialysis and patients with AKI
caused by crush syndrome in times of disaster as the
primary purpose” of the preparation for disasters. The
core activity of JADP focused on the establishment of a
disaster management plan by the participating facilities
and, for that purpose, the establishment of branch offices
of JADP in each prefecture. Since 1999, the Internet-
based information system for disasters, which had
already been operating in Chiba Prefecture, has devel-
oped into a nationwide system. An information trans-
mission drill has been performed once a year since
2000 up to the present.
The disaster information network of JADP consists of
two information-sharing tools utilizing the Internet: a
web-based disaster information network created for rap-
idly sharing precise information among affected areas,
support areas, and governments in times of disaster
(http://www.saigai-touseki.net/) and a crisis-management
mailing list that was created as a nationwide
information-sharing tool in 2003. This disaster infor-
mation network functioned well during GEJED, enab-
ling the establishment of a dialysis support system
around an affected area or in a broader area as de-
scribed later in their document. As a result, dialysis
support was provided across the country to more
than 10,000 patients during GEJED.
Approach of facilities to providing dialysis therapy during
disasters
Since GHAED in 1995, increasing attention has been
paid to how to provide dialysis therapy in the event of
earthquakes and how to prepare for earthquakes in dialysis
rooms. Akatsuka [7], in collaboration with JADP, summa-
rized the damage to dialysis rooms caused by the Niigata
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake by referring to his experiences inthe area in Hokkaido frequently hit by earthquakes, and he
has emphasized the significance of preparing beforehand
for earthquakes in dialysis rooms. On the basis of past ex-
periences, it was reported that the direct damage to dialysis
rooms was prevented in earthquakes of intensity 5 and that
maintenance dialysis was performed even in earthquakes
of intensity 6+ [7]. GEJED occurred amid the growing rec-
ognition of the significance of preparation for earthquakes
in dialysis rooms. As previously mentioned, this was the
third earthquake reaching the maximum intensity 7 follow-
ing GHAED in 1995 and Niigata Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
in 2004. The Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake oc-
curred in the early morning on a Tuesday when dialysis
therapy was not performed in dialysis facilities. In the
Niigata Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, there were no dialysis
facilities in the area where the maximum intensity 7 was
recorded. GEJED, however, occurred during the midday
hours of Friday when dialysis therapy was being performed
in dialysis facilities. There were dialysis facilities in
the area where intensity 7 was recorded. This was a
historical earthquake for dialysis therapy because it
was the first time that an earthquake of intensity 7
occurred during the hours when the therapy was be-
ing performed. It was a good opportunity to see if
the disaster management measures that had been im-
plemented at dialysis facilities were effective. The
various experiences obtained from this disaster will
provide us with important knowledge about the prep-
aration for large earthquakes that may occur in the
future.
Results of survey of dialysis therapy during GEJED
Survey of dialysis therapy during GEJED
The WG was proposed by Tadao Akizawa, the President of
JSDT, at the time of the disaster in 2011. The WG consisted
of the representatives of four organizations, namely, JSDT,
JADP, JSN, and the Japan Association for Clinical Engineers
(JACE), the representatives of the affected prefectures and
the prefectures providing support, and the members of the
Committee of the renal data registry of JSDT. A nationwide
survey by the WG was conducted as the 2011 year-end sur-
vey by the Committee of the renal data registry of JSDT
(JSDT registry) on 4255 dialysis facilities in Japan, and 4213
facilities responded. The 2011 year-end survey consisted of
21 questions for the affected areas as well as support areas,
including questions about facility damage, requests for
dialysis support, and disaster management measures taken
at the facilities (Table 3). The response rates were about
85–95 %. Because more detailed information was required
to summarize the recommendations for disaster manage-
ment measures, an additional survey was conducted in
September 2013 on 315 facilities that had answered that
dialysis services were interrupted in their facilities for some
reason, and 298 facilities responded.
Table 3 Items included in survey of dialysis therapy during GEJED
Facility damage
1. Seismic intensity at the facility site
2. Structure of buildings where dialysis equipment is located
3. Completion date of buildings where dialysis equipment is located
4. Seismic resistance of buildings where dialysis equipment is located
Interruption of dialysis services
5. Experience of the interruption of dialysis services due to the disaster
6. Length of time taken to resume dialysis services
7. Reasons for the interruption of dialysis services
Patient transfer and schedule adjustment
8. Requests for dialysis support to other hospitals
9. Acceptance of dialysis patients from other hospitals
10. Number of dialysis patients accepted
11. Schedule adjustment due to the acceptance of patients
12. Schedule adjustment due to the disaster
Disaster countermeasures at the facility (at the time of disaster/at the
end of 2011)
13. Presence of private power generation systems that can be used
for dialysis theraphy and their installation sites
14. Presence of water tanks (well water) for emergency use and
their sizes
15. Earthquake-proof measures for RO systems and dialysis fluid
delivery systems
16. Piping materials used for dialysis fluid delivery systems
17. Earthquake-proof measures for bedside consoles
18. Locking of bed casters
19. Means of information gathering and communication in times
of disaster
20. Preparation of emergency release
21. Provision of information to patients receiving dialysis services
under normal conditions
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measures taken at facilities
In GEJED, three facilities in Miyagi Prefecture experi-
enced an earthquake of intensity 7. It was the first time
in the history of dialysis therapy that dialysis facilities
were hit by an earthquake of intensity 7 while they were
providing dialysis services. However, 221 dialysis facil-
ities in the Tohoku and Kanto regions experienced an
earthquake of intensity 6− or more, which accounted for
5.7 % of the responding facilities. Most of the facilities
located in Hokkaido and the Chubu-Tokai region and in
the west of the Kinki region experienced an earthquake
of intensity 4 or lower. The dialysis facilities in the
Tohoku region were most severely damaged by GEJED
and those in the Kanto region, which has a high popula-
tion density, were also severely affected (Figs. 2 and 3).
Dialysis services were interrupted for various reasons
during the disaster in 315 facilities located in 16prefectures, mostly in Tohoku and Kanto regions. The
higher the intensity of the earthquake, the higher the
percentage of facilities that experienced interruption:
100 % of the facilities hit by an earthquake of intensity 7
experienced interruption for various reasons, 69.8 % with
intensity 6+, and 51.2 % with intensity 6− (Fig. 4). The fa-
cilities were allowed to give multiple reasons for the inter-
ruption. The most common reason was power outage,
which was encountered by 72.0 % of the facilities. The rea-
sons for the interruption in all three facilities in Miyagi
Prefecture, which were hit by an earthquake of intensity 7,
were power and water outages, not facility nor equipment
damage from the earthquake. However, a few facilities that
were hit by an earthquake of intensity 3, 4, or 5 experi-
enced the interruption of dialysis services due to facility
and equipment damage (Fig. 4).
Dialysis facilities have been encouraged to take the fol-
lowing four measures in preparation for earthquakes [7].
1) Un-lock the casters of floor-type dialysis monitors.
2) Lock the casters of dialysis beds.
3) Fasten dialysis fluid delivery systems and reverse
osmosis (RO) systems to the floor with anchor bolts
or place those devices on a base isolation stand.
4) Use flexible tubes for the connection of dialysis fluid
delivery systems and RO systems to the wall of a
machine room.
According to the results of the 2011 year-end JSDT
registry, the measures regarding dialysis monitors and
patient beds were implemented in 90 % or more of the
facilities. However, the fastening of large machinery,
such as dialysis fluid delivery systems and RO systems
and the use of flexible tubes, was implemented in less
than 50 % of the facilities (Table 4). While the incidence
of dialysis service interruption due to facility damage
was low in Miyagi Prefecture, which experienced a high-
intensity earthquake, some facilities in the regions where
the intensity of earthquake was 5 or lower experienced
interruption due to facility damage. Therefore, the rela-
tionship between earthquake-proof measures and equip-
ment damage was examined by conducting an additional
survey. The results of the additional survey showed that
the incidence of equipment damage in Miyagi Prefecture,
which experienced a very high-intensity earthquake, was
almost the same as that in Ibaraki Prefecture, which expe-
rienced a seismic intensity one or two levels lower. More-
over, the percentage of facilities that implemented the
fastening of large machinery, such as dialysis fluid delivery
systems and RO systems and the use of flexible tubes, was
significantly higher in Miyagi Prefecture. These results
showed that it is important to fasten RO systems and dia-
lysis fluid delivery systems to the floor and to use flexible
tubes for piping to avoid the interruption of dialysis
Fig. 2 Facilities that experienced interruption of dialysis services in each prefecture. Left: Number of facilities that experienced interruption of
dialysis services. Right: Percentage of facilities that experienced interruption of dialysis services
Fig. 3 Seismic intensity and facilities that experienced interruption of dialysis services. Left: Number of facilities that experienced interruption of
dialysis services. Right: Percentage of facilities that experienced interruption of dialysis services. The higher the seismic intensity, the higher the
percentage of facilities that experienced interruption of dialysis services. Some facilities that were hit by an earthquake of moderate intensity
(3 or 4) also experienced interruptions
Masakane et al. Renal Replacement Therapy  (2016) 2:48 Page 8 of 15
Fig. 4 Reasons for interruption of dialysis services in terms of seismic intensity. Left: Number of facilities by different reasons. Right: Percentage of
facilities by different reasons. The most common reason for the interruption was power outage. Some facilities that were hit by an earthquake of
moderate intensity (3 or 4) also experienced the interruption due to facility damage. Facility and equipment damage due to earthquake/power
outages (except for rolling blackouts)/water outages
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period oscillation may account for the facility damage
particularly in the facilities located on the middle floors of
a building in remote areas in the Kanto region, where the
intensity of the earthquake was relatively low.
Impact of private electric generators and water tanks
Private electric generators, which are generally thought
to be useful for providing dialysis services in the event
of power outages, were installed in 55.4 % of the 3559
facilities that responded to the relevant question. There
was a substantial difference among prefectures in the in-
stallation of private electric generators. The percentage
of facilities having private electric generators was low in
the prefectures with large, densely populated cities; the
lowest was in Tokyo (37.3 %) followed by Chiba (38.2 %)
and Osaka (39.4 %). The status of the installation of
water tanks was almost the same as that of private
electric generators. However, among the 315 facilities
that experienced the interruption of dialysis services,
67.7 % of the 124 facilities that had private electric
generators indicated “power outage” as the reason for
the interruption. The additional survey revealed theseTable 4 Percentage of facilities that implemented four measures
at the time of disaster
① Not locking dialysis monitors 92.3 %
② Locking dialysis beds 93.2 %
③ Fastening dialysis fluid delivery systems and RO system 48.4 %
④ Using flexible tubes 47.1 %
2011 year-end survey by the JSDT registryreasons why this was the case: they could not generate a
sufficient amount of power needed for maintenance
dialysis; they could not obtain oil for the generators; or
the electric generators did not work because of a lack of
regular maintenance. Similarly, among the 315 facilities
that experienced interruptions in dialysis service, 45.5 %
of the 110 facilities that had water tanks indicated “water
outage” as the reason for the interruption. These outages
occurred because of power outages, water supply short-
ages, and damage to water storage equipment. As already
mentioned, even when dialysis facilities install private
electric generators and water tanks, there is a possibility
that such equipment will not work depending on the scale
and characteristics of disasters. Such equipment cannot
provide absolute security. It is important to develop a mu-
tual assistance system to meet the needs in each area.
Patient transfer for maintenance dialysis in alternative place
Of the 315 facilities that experienced the interruption of
dialysis services, almost half (161 facilities) requested
other facilities to provide dialysis to their patients. We
asked the dialysis facilities nationwide whether they
accepted dialysis patients transferred to them from the
affected areas. Of the 3928 responding facilities, 992
facilities answered that they accepted such patients. The
number of patients accepted was 10,906 in total, and the
numbers of hospitalized patients and outpatients were
1078 and 9828, respectively (Table 6). Most of the
patients were transferred to the Kanto region or sur-
rounding prefectures that were not severely damaged,
while some patients were transferred within the affected
areas, namely, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Fukushima, and Iwate
Table 5 Percentage of facilities that implemented four measures and percentage of facilities where equipment was damaged in
three prefectures
Fastening dialysis fluid delivery systems
and RO systems to floor (%)
Using flexible tubes for
connection (%)
Dialysis monitors (%) Dialysis beds (%) Equipment damage (%)
Miyagi 92.5 92.5 87.8 85.2 14.3
Fukushima 73.2 58.9 90.9 86.2 26.4
Ibaraki 43.8 50.0 85.8 93.3 11.4
Additional survey of 298 facilities
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was that a large-scale patient transfer was required be-
cause the continuation of dialysis therapy became impos-
sible in wide areas because of the damage to infrastructure
caused by the huge tsunami and the damage to local med-
ical resources caused by the accidents at the power sta-
tions of Tokyo Electric Power Company. Eighty patients
were transferred from Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture to
Hokkaido, and 382 patients were transferred from Iwaki
City in Fukushima Prefecture to Tokyo, 154 to Niigata Pre-
fecture, and 45 to Chiba Prefecture (Fig. 5). Japan Self-
Defense Force planes were used to transfer the patients
from Miyagi Prefecture to Hokkaido, and large buses were
used to transfer the patients from Iwaki City. In the past ex-
periences, electricity was restored within 48 h and water
supplies were restored within 4 days even after a large
earthquake. However, in GEJED the disruption of infra-
structure lasted a long time in the areas damaged by the
tsunami, particularly in Miyagi Prefecture, and it took a
long time to restore the infrastructure needed to provide
maintenance dialysis. Therefore, the WG proposed that,
when the interruption of dialysis services lasts for more
than 4 days and is expected to be further prolonged, the
transfer of patients to other facilities outside affected areas
should be considered.Table 6 Number of facilities that accepted more than 100 dialysis














Total 992 10,906Along with the acceptance of patients, 257 facilities
(25.9 % of the facilities that accepted the patients) chan-
ged their dialysis schedule, most of them for less than a
month. However, the dialysis schedule was adjusted
because of rolling blackouts in 736 facilities, which was
far more than the number of facilities that accepted the
patients. The schedule needed to be adjusted because of
rolling blackouts in the Tohoku, Hokkaido, Kanto,
Koshinetsu, and Chubu regions but not in the Kinki,
Shikoku, and Kyushu regions. In times of large-scale dis-
aster, rolling blackouts will become a problem not only
in affected areas but also across the country.
PD therapy in times of disaster
While hemodialysis is an in-house treatment largely relying
on infrastructure for electricity, water supply, and smooth
distribution of products among other needs, peritonealFig. 5 Large-scale transfer of patients. Self-Defense Force planes were
used to transfer patients from Fukushima Prefecture to Hokkaido, and
large buses were used to transfer patients in other areas. pts. patients
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infrastructure. As described previously, in GEJED, the
continuation of hemodialysis became impossible because
of the damage to the infrastructure in wide areas caused by
the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. More than 10,000
patients across the country needed dialysis support, and it
was necessary to transfer a large number of patients from
Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures. The status of PD
patients in GEJED has not been investigated in detail prob-
ably because the incidence of severe problems encountered
in continuing PD therapy was significantly lower than that
for hemodialysis. The following describes the status of PD
patients in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures that
were severely damaged by the disaster.
There were 144 PD patients in Iwate Prefecture when
the disaster occurred. Of them, one patient who lived in
the coastal area died in the tsunami, 12 patients were
hospitalized because of power outages, and 5 patients
needed hospital treatment for medical conditions such
as peritonitis. There were 36 patients living in the
coastal area severely damaged by the tsunami. Of them,
13 patients needed to move to other areas to receive
dialysis because their houses were washed away or inun-
dated or because of the long-term power outage.
Twenty-two patients could stay in their homes and con-
tinue dialysis. Because the inland area of Iwate Prefec-
ture was less devastated and the prefectural hospitals
were well prepared for disasters, the facilities in the in-
land area could provide early support to the facilities in
the coastal area. The problem that arose in all areas was
how to secure a stable power supply for connection
devices and automated PD (APD) machines during the
power outage. This problem was overcome by using the
manual exchange technique called continuous ambula-
tory PD (CAPD) or by recharging the devices at fire
departments. After the power supply was restored, PD
was continued stably.
There were 63 PD patients in Miyagi Prefecture, and
one of them who lived in the coastal area died in the
tsunami. There were 20 PD outpatients in the Japan
Community Health Care Organization (JCOH) of Sendai
Hospital, located at the central inland area of the prefec-
ture, and they had fewer problems than the hemodialysis
patients who faced many serious problems. Of the 20
patients, 12 were CAPD patients. They had a sufficient
stock of dialysis fluids in their homes and therefore
continued the home-based treatment. Eight were APD
patients, and five of them could not continue APD
because of power outages. They continued dialysis by
changing from APD to CAPD and soon went back to
APD after the power supply was restored. Two patients
were hospitalized, one because the patient’s house was
damaged, and the other because the patient developed
peritonitis after changing the dialysis mode. The hospitalprovided dialysis support to hemodialysis patients from
36 facilities beginning the day after the occurrence of
the disaster, but there were no PD patients from other
facilities who needed dialysis support. There were 17 PD
patients in Senseki Hospital located at the coastal area
of the prefecture, and one of them died in the tsunami.
Because the area was severely damaged by the tsunami,
these patients faced many problems such as the washing
away of houses and dialysis equipment, long-term power
outages, and difficulties in securing a place for the
exchange of dialysis fluids. The hospital also had a small
stock of dialysis fluids, so it offered a limited range of
dialysis services while waiting for the emergency delivery
of dialysis fluids.
There were 152 PD patients in Fukushima Prefecture.
The hospital staff and the PD companies tried to
confirm the safety of patients and could contact all the
patients except for one missing patient within a week of
the disaster. Some patients could not receive PD therapy
at their hospitals, but they received PD therapy at the
back-up hospitals. The provision of dialysis support was
not a burden to those hospitals because the frequency of
hospital visits was usually once every 2 to 4 weeks for
PD patients.
The reports from the affected areas showed that, as we
expected, the problems affecting PD patients were much
fewer than those affecting hemodialysis patients. The
reasons for this may be that PD relies less on social in-
frastructure for electricity and water supply and that
there is no problem about the transportation to dialysis
facilities because PD is a home-based treatment with a
certain amount of dialysis fluids stored at patients’
homes. During GEJED, the transportation available to
hemodialysis patients was very limited because of the
damage to roads across wide areas caused by the tsu-
nami or the lack of gasoline due to the interruption of
product distribution. The residential area of PD patients
is larger than that of hemodialysis patients, and medical
institutes may have difficulties in confirming the safety
of their patients. However, the PD companies regularly
contact patients requiring their delivery of PD fluid and
those companies can help confirm the safety of the pa-
tients. Although electricity is needed for bag-exchange
devices and APD, PD can be continued during the acute
phase after a disaster by changing from APD to CAPD,
as mentioned in the report from the affected areas. We
have concluded that PD was far more resilient to disas-
ters than hemodialysis, as shown by the experiences in
GEJED.
Clinical conditions of dialysis patients in times of disaster
As described previously, there are two problems in dialysis
therapy during large-scale disasters: the provision of dialy-
sis as an emergency treatment and the maintenance of
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because, when a large number of patients develop AKI
due to crush syndrome and require dialysis therapy, it
affects the continuation of chronic maintenance dialysis.
When the patients undergoing maintenance dialysis
develop crush syndrome, their clinical condition is consid-
ered urgent or life-threatening because of the effects of
hyperkalemia and acidosis due to muscle degeneration.
The immediate transfer to emergency care hospitals is
crucial for their survival.
The death toll for GEJED was 19,335 (official announce-
ment of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency on 9
September 2015 [4]), which was nearly threefold that for
GHAED. In GEJED, the causes of death were 92.5 % of
the victims drowning in tsunami, 4.4 % crushing and fatal
injuries, 1.1 % fire, and 2 % unknown [1]. On the other
hand, in GHAED, 85.7 % of the victims died as a direct re-
sult of the earthquake. Among them, 72.6 % died from
suffocation and crushing, 7.8 % died from traumatic
shock, and 7.4 % died from fire. In GEJED, most of the
victims died from drowning and few patients developed
acute renal disorder. Hence, medical institutes focused on
continuing maintenance dialysis.
In times of large-scale disaster, various cardiovascular
events are induced by increased sympathetic nervous
system tone due to physical and psychological stress and
thrombotic tendency due to decreased daily activity.
Dialysis patients often have to eat the same meals as other
evacuees at evacuation centers. Therefore, they face the
risk of various health problems, including congestive heart
failure due to excess salt intake and hyperkalemia, or they
may develop dehydration due to the excessive care about
hyperkalemia and excess salt intake [8].
There have been reports from the affected areas about
the hemodynamic changes of dialysis patients in GEJED.
Some reported that there was no change in blood pres-
sure, while many reported that a temporary increase in
blood pressure was observed after the disaster. The
increase in blood pressure was not caused by an in-
crease in extracellular body fluid but may be caused
by stress. The JCHO Sendai hospital in Miyagi Prefec-
ture reported that 67 patients were hospitalized
because of congestive heart failure during the
3 months following the disaster, which was more thanTable 7 Number of deaths from specific causes per 1000 dialysis pa
Total deaths (%) Heart failure (%) C
Iwate 102.7 113.8 99
Miyagi 114.7 106.3 10
Fukushima 117.0 126.0 10
Three prefectures in Tohoku 112.3 115.2 10
Four prefectures in Shikoku 101.8 89.9 91
Entire country 103.5 102.0 98twice that during the same period of the preceding
year (29 patients).
According to the comparison of the cause of death in
dialysis patients in 2010 [9] and 2011 [10], there was a
larger increase in the number of deaths from the disaster
and from heart failure in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
Prefectures, which were hit by the disaster, compared
with the national average and the average of the four
prefectures in Shikoku where the impact of the disaster
was small (Table 7). On the other hand, according to the
general population census statistics of the Ministry of
Health, Labor, and Welfare [10], the number of deaths
from accidents, heart disease, and pneumonia increased
in the general population in the three devastated prefec-
tures (Table 8). These data suggest that dialysis patients
are prone to develop heart failure.
As described, it is acknowledged that both dialysis
therapy and chronic dialysis patients are vulnerable in
disasters. Sakai [11] reported that even dialysis patients
who appeared in good condition in the aftermath of t
GHAED died suddenly, due to brain hemorrhage,
gastrointestinal bleeding, or unknown causes, 6 months
or later after the earthquake, indicating how much stress
the patients experience in the time of large-scale disas-
ters. Kario also reported that patients were prone to de-
velop cardiovascular events in times of disaster, but that
patients who were taking α- or β-blockers and diabetic
patients with autonomic neuropathy showed less in-
crease in blood pressure [12]. Elevated blood pressure in
facilities and home was also reported in GEJED [13, 14].
Tanaka et al. suggested the advantage of RAS inhibitors
for home blood pressure stability under a disaster [14].
On the basis of these survey results and past reports,
the WG proposed that chronic dialysis patients should
have adequate sleep and keep their body and mind at
rest, should measure their blood pressure and pulse and
receive appropriate antihypertensive treatment including
sympathetic blockers, and should avoid over-hydration
and dehydration in times of disaster.
Conclusions
The survey of dialysis therapy during GEJED showed
that, as previously suggested, both dialysis therapy and
patients undergoing maintenance dialysis are vulnerabletients in 2011 compared with previous year
erebral vascular (%) Infection (%) Malignancy (%) Disaster (%)
.3 72.5 78.7 827.3
1.0 129.6 59.7 1645.6
3.8 104.2 80.3 169.2
1.6 102.4 71.6 887.9
.3 114.7 124.0 227.8
.1 103.7 96.1 166.1
Table 8 Number of deaths from specific causes per 100,000 general population in 2011 compared with previous year
Total deaths (%) Heart disease (%) Cerebral vascular (%) Pneumonia (%) Malignancy (%) Accident (%)
Iwate 143.0 108.2 112.4 108.1 100.1 1107.3
Miyagi 156.4 113.2 105.5 120.4 99.0 1517.2
Fukushima 116.9 114.4 102.5 115.8 102.3 315.6
Three prefectures in Tohoku 137.8 111.8 107.2 114.1 100.5 938.8
Four prefectures in Shikoku 102.8 101.6 102.3 105.1 99.7 100.1
Entire country 104.9 103.1 100.5 105.1 101.3 147.0
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chronic dialysis, dialysis facilities should take the four
disaster management measures proposed by Akatsuka to
prevent the interruption of dialysis services due to facility
damage. However, the effectiveness of self-help efforts is
limited in certain large-scale disasters. It is, therefore, ne-
cessary to establish mutual assistance systems for support-
ing dialysis therapy in local areas through the provision of
electricity, water, and fuels such as gasoline and oil. When
a disaster of a much larger scale occurs, it is impossible to
support dialysis patients by self-help efforts and mutual
assistance systems alone. Public help is required in such a
disaster.
Dialysis patients are likely to develop cardiovascular
events because of physical and psychological stress due
to a disaster. They should keep their body and mind at
rest and receive an appropriate antihypertensive treat-
ment to reduce the sympathetic nervous system tone.
They should also understand in advance the precautions
to be taken for daily self-care, communication method
in times of disaster, and the availability of dialysis ther-
apy in remote locations.
In the event of a huge disaster that may occur in the
future, the measures required to provide dialysis therapy
smoothly will be different from those required in GEJED
depending on the type of disaster, the extent of damage,
the number of dialysis patients living in an affected area,
and the occurrence of acute traumatic AKI. However, it
is possible to minimize the damage to dialysis therapy
facilities caused by disasters if each dialysis facility and
each local community now take as many of the measures
as possible that are proposed in this report.
Appendix 1
Recommendations from the survey of dialysis therapy
during GEJED
I. Disaster countermeasures for dialysis facilities, the
securing of lifelines, and a support system for
supplying resources
1. Dialysis facilities should adopt the basic disaster
countermeasures of dialysis rooms to avoid the
interruption of dialysis services caused by direct
damage to the rooms.2. Local medical networks should be formed to
secure power and water cooperatively among
dialysis facilities, rather than depending on the
government, if the lifelines are destroyed.II. Future disaster countermeasures based on the
experiences in the affected facilities
1. Previous disaster cases should be analyzed to
plan disaster countermeasures considering
the characteristics of each local area.
2. Methods of storing medical resources within the
local medical network should be examined to
ensure the continuity of dialysis services without
external support for 48 h after the occurrence of
the disaster.
3. The transfer of patients outside the affected area
should be examined if the period of interruption
of dialysis services exceeds four days or is
expected to last longer depending on the degree
of damage to lifelines and facilities.
4. Multiple communication and information
transmission methods for emergencies should be
prepared.
5. In emergencies, termination of dialysis session
should be performed by a regular blood return
method because the regular method is reliable and
safe. Urgent special release techniques should be
adopted depending on the degree of urgency.
6. PD is less vulnerable than other blood
purification methods during disasters.
7. The supply of power using private power
generation systems and of water using water
tanks was highly effective at large facilities, such
as disaster base hospitals and local dialysis core
hospitals.
8. Local core hospitals for chronic dialysis should
be considered separately from anti-disaster
center hospitals.III. Transfer of dialysis patients during disasters and
dialysis therapy at alternative facilities
1. If dialysis facilities cannot continue chronic dialysis
therapy or cannot secure sufficient amounts of
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provided with dialysis services at alternative
facilities.
2. The alternative dialysis facilities for the patients
should be selected by considering where they live
and how they will get there.
3. The transfer of patients should be planned by
closely sharing information between the affected
and alternative facilities.
4. The patients undergoing dialysis at alternative
facilities for a long time should be provided daily
life necessities and moral support.IV. Care of dialysis patients during disasters
1. Dialysis patients should be treated so that they
have sufficient time to sleep and they maintain
both physical and mental health.
2. The blood pressure and pulse of the dialysis
patients should be measured to determine
appropriate antihypertensive therapy.
3. Attention should be paid to over-hydration and
dehydration of the dialysis patients.V. Support of human and material resources during
disasters
1. An advance group should be organized to collect
information on the affected facilities during
large-scale disasters.
2. Training programs for volunteers during
disasters should be prepared.
3. Dialysis-related material resources should be
procured under the support of the government
and arranged as packages separate from other
medical information in a network specialized for
dialysis patients.VI. Tokyo inland earthquake
1. Disaster countermeasures of dialysis facilities
should be planned by considering the features of
dialysis facilities in urban areas.
2. A network of dialysis facilities in urban areas
should be formed.
3. Disaster countermeasures for a Tokyo Inland
Earthquake should be regularly discussed
beforehand between dialysis facilities and local
governments.VII. Formation of collaborative systems among local
dialysis facilities and governments, regular
communications, and patient education1. A regional information-sharing network for
disasters should be formed.2. The dialysis system to be used during disasters
should be discussed between dialysis facilities
and local governments.
3. Consensus on the type of minimum necessary
information on dialysis patients to be
transmitted to alternative facilities for providing
dialysis and the transmission method during
disasters should be obtained beforehand.
4. Dialysis providers should obtain approval from
patients about the possibility of undergoing
dialysis at remote alternative facilities during
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